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Infants a ci Their Torts.

7Tha'f:[ II.

,--7

is

Cornell University School of Lav;,

THE INFANT AND HIS TORTS.

Infancy.
Infancy is

that stage of a human being's life,

wherein, by reason of his youth, he is

:7ot Tresumed, by law,

to have reached that maturity of min, which should make him
calable of judging and acting for himself.
not the same.

All minds are

Some mat,-'e eozrlie-r than others.

Therefore

many infants are as caT-able of choosing for themselves at the
ae of fifteen years, as other& at the age of twenty-one.

But the la. canniot loo: to every individual and decide his
case separately.
upon sc-ne a-e

We Qust for convenience and stability fix
-'cclarc

overy -ercon to be at his majority

upon attainirg suoh age.
we find that tho female xx~r
and

lc's

ncver allo:e,

7ob

the la-T of the early Romeans,

suble t to

e-cetual guardianship

-elr _ ajorit , excert wVhen she married.
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1-m
-

This state of affo irJustinian,

by the civil 1 y,

were considcrC'-_ at their

years,

botI- the LFer-le

r.ao-itc

o

r

l-:oi

the male

cn

tic age of

By the Co:7:fon Law of Englail,

twent:-fivo years.
to .lackstone.

an-7 at thne time of

ally changcd,

twenty-one

"tqe fal agc in male or fe:nale is

wvhich age is

-ora:lcted on the day preceding the anniver-

sary of a yeroson's birth, who until that ti:'le is
and so styled in

la,:. "

Infancy is

bility.

by the la,; of Englam.

from cont-r _.ct lia-

exe L-,t for the nost -art

At a cert .in

an infant,

:,rivileged by the law.

The person under t- onty-one ycars of age,
and America is

according

stage of infancy the rerson is

clusively presumed incapable of

cOT.L:.itting

crime.

con-

Whether or

not the infant is liable for his tort it is mainly our purpose to investigate and determine.
Prevailing

Dinion that the Father is

Liable.-

At the vcry out-set of this -iscussion there is a snag to be
encountered.

it

is

the wide spread iea

among the laymen,

that the father is responsible for the torts of his minor
child.

Remarkable as this may seem,

considering that the law

has been settled upon this -oint for so many years, nevertheless, we find it true.

if

a child go down town and break in
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the glass front to a .orchant's store, the merchant, in nine
cases out of te,
covery in

will beliove himself to have a full re-

damages against the child's father.

also will believe himself liable,
with the bill will pay it.

And the father

and upon being presented

Perhals this cor.,.mon opinion may

be said to come from the beliof that the father is solely
responsible for the bei-'ig of the child,

that the child is

brought into the world for personal gratification of the
parent

and that he should watch over and educate him in what

his right and wro-g;', that the tort or 7-ronbe

trace-I bac}: to the neglect of the parent

cation;

and that,

of the child may
in

such edu-

therefore the parent should be made to suf-

fer and so be held rcopponsible for the tort.

if

this be the

foundation for this yrevailing notion, it is unsound,- the
child is

not brought into this world simply through per-

sonal gratification of the parent, but because of a duty owing
to mankind.

To cause the child to be perretually watched

would impair him for society, and to im-ose upon the parent
this duty would be absurd.

That a father should be held re-

sponsible for the wrongful acts of his infant child would also
put the future of the father in constant peril.

But the law

star--ed this

octrinc as unsound.

Remedy -ivcn at Early Roman La':.- It is true that
in the earlr Roman Laj, there .ias a remedy against the father
for the tort of the child.

When an injury was done by the

child, the father could either pay damages or surrender up
But at this -(--Jod

the chil.

it must be remembered that
better than the slave,

the child was consiaiered but little

that the same remedy was given against the master for the
tort of his slave, as for the tort of his child, and that
there was no remedy against the child or slave.

Later the

child was considered as something better, and it was not required that he should be surrcnc.
a wron'g.

upon the co=ission of

The general rrinciz.!e of the Roman Law "That

.cause by
every person is responsible, not only for in.uries

his own act, but for all th.t are caused by the act of persons
and things under his dominion,'

is adopted in the Civil Code

of France (Article 1384), but, the father is not held liable
for the tort of his chilo

:hich he was not able to prevent;

and the same intcr-retation is given to this :rinciple in
the State of La.,
(Cleveland v.

Ulayo,

in w.hose code it
19 La., 414;

has been also adopted.
Governor v.

Lambeth,

9 La.,

241).
At the Enrglish Lam,, the're is
Father.-

As a -oneral

pro?,,osition,

the English Law thore is

no Reme.dy against the

it

may be saAd that;

at

no Resj onsibliity placed up:on the

Father for the torts of his infant fchild.

The English

courts are quite emphatic upon this point; and in one case
a modern one 7ecided in the year 1860, the court went very
close to the region, where the em:rloyer should be held liable
for the torts of his employee,
service,

and declared the father exemrpt.

of Moon v.

Tiners (8 C.B.(N.S.)

trespass and false imprisonment.
defendant's' son was wa-ng
Theatre.
the son,

committed while acting in his

611).:-

This was the case
The action was for

The facts are these;

The

for hin as treasurer of his

The proIxrty man of the Theatre, was alleged, by
to have embezzled the funds and was thereupon taken

before a magistrate who remanded but ultimately discharged
him.
done.
In

After the remand the son told' his father what he had
The father did not prohibit 4he son from proceeding.

the opinion the Court said:-

"! am riot a'.:are of any such

relation between a father and son, thou,"h the son be living
with his father as a member of his family,

as I:iA make the

--

acts of the son more binding upon the f ther than the acts
of anybody else.

is

that when it

I ayrrehond,

established

that a father is not liable upon contracts mrade by his son
within age,

except they be for nec&7saries,

against the whole tenor of the law

it

would be going

to hold him liable for

No man ought, as a general rule,

his son's trespasses.

to be responsible for acts not his o::."
The same principle v!hich is

given for the English

Law will be found to govern in the majority of the states of
the Union.
175,

Tifft v.

Let us look at some of the cases.
Tifft,

In 4 Denio,

the ;laintiff brought an action for

damages against the father of a minor daughter,

because of

the child's having set a dog ovned by the father upon a
neighbor's hog, and hilling it.

The court said;- "The de-

fendant was not answerable for the act of his daughter done
in his absence and without his authority or approval."
case of Baker v.

Halderman,

24

o., 219,

The

was an action to

recover damages for assault uon the mincr chili of the -laintiff

by the minor child of the defendant.

the plaintiff, in this action,

statc

The petition of

"that the son of the

defendant became and was dangerous to the plaintiff and her
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children by reason of his viscious and destructive temper and
of his sudden and causeless fits of anger, and that the
plaintiff notifi(ed the cefcnrant of said fact, and desired
him to restrain and con 4 rol '-is son, to the end that she and
her children might live in safety; that said defendant failed
and neglected to restrain and control

-lis said son, and that

in consequence of such failure and Jeglect
sulted."

The retition

iaid injury re-

s demurred to by the defendant, on

the ground that the father was not responsible for injuries
caused by an assault made by his ainor child.
was sustained.

The demurer

This dase decides for us, that the child is

not to be loohed upon as the dog or other animal; that although the owner may be held liable for the injuries inflicted
by his dog, which he kne: to be viscious, not so for the injuries committed by his child.

These cases will suffice to

show the law as it stands to day in this country, and we

may

consider them as showing the principle waich has been adopted
in the different

atates of the Union.

Excertions to General Rule.-

Having found the

general -Irinciple to be as above we Ywili now consider what

-0-

are called by some writers and cited in some cases, Decisions to the Contrary, or Exceptions.

It shall be tried

to show that these, however, are only apparent excertions
and that they leave the general ,-riici-le
in

a Penn.

case (39 Pa. ,177)

unharmed.

Thaus

the father w,_s held liable for

injuries done by reason of a collision between his wagon and
that of the plaintiff's, caused by his son's negligent and
reckless driving, the father being seated all the while beside his son and permitting the same.

In this case, it was

not the tort of the infant which was the true ground of the
decision, but it

vwas the negligence of the father in permit-

ting his son to be so reckless while he could easily have
prevented him from being so, which caused his liability.
It was the tort of the father and not that of the son which
was the true basis of the decision.

If the father had not

been present, in this case, and helped about the commission
of the injury, he would not have been held responsible.
Another instance where the father has been liable, is where
the wrong is done at his express cori.mand.

The same reason-

ing will apply in this case as in the other; it
own wrong for which he is made responsible.

is the fatherl

By running

-9-

through the cases we will find that, whore the father is not
present when the wrong is

committed, and when he could not

prevent the wrong from being comiitted, he is exempt from liability.

(46 Mie.,

302)

Under circumstances where he can prevent the injury is he not himself guilty of the tort negligence?
Suprosod Analogy between the Relation of Man and
Wife--and Parent and Child.-

Before leaving the subject of

the Parent's Liability it may be well to look at the analogy
which by some is supposed to exist between the Relation of
Parent and Child,

and that of Husband and

tion may be ashed,-

Why,

ife.

since at the Common Law,

The questhe hus-

band v'as held liable for the torts of his wife, should he
not be held responsible for those of his minor child?

And

it may be answered in this way: that the husband upon marrying
came into -ossession and right of all the wife's property.
The personal property became his absolutely and the use of
the realty was given him during life.

In order

anyone, therefore, it must be the husband.

o hold

MTaile in the

relation existing between the parent and his child we find no
such condition of

7ffairs.

The father was not entitled to

-10-

In the former case, since
hawageF of the chili.
to ok
that
the husbandall the property, it was no .,ore than fair

more than

he should be held liable;

while,

the latter

in

case,

,ye find

If the child is entitled to his Troperty,

no such reason.

whi not bring the action

To sustain this

gainst him?

argument that it was the right of the husband in the property
of the wife which caused his liability for the torts of the
wife,

YOe have only to look.,

at the .present day,

in

the states

where statutes have been passed taking these property rights
Here we will find that the -:usba-cd is no longer lia-

away.

ble for the wife's torts.
That the infant is
himself,

is

2 Kent's Co=-., 241;

9 N.H., 441;

17 'is.,

for torts comnnitted by

well settled in the Un.ited States and England.-

23 N.H., 507;
257;

liable,

231;

10 Vt.,

71;

14 C.B.(N.S.), 45;

Intent.-

3 Wend., 391;

8 T.R.,

335;

3 McCord,

16 Mass.,

089;

107 Mass., 251.

For those torts in which merely force is

involved and no maliciousness is present, the infant has been
held responsible at any age and vitbout regard to the intent
with which they were committed.

The law is inclined to

look at the injury done and not the intent.

Mr. Tyler, in
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says:-

his work on

"Infants arc liable at any age,

for in case of civil injuries with force the intention is
not regardodf,

and cites 29 Bar'.,

218.

In

. 'isconsin

case,

17 Wis., 231, a child under the age of seven years was held
liable in trespass for breahing down the shrubbery and flowers
of amghbor's flower garden.

But in those cases where malice is a necessary ingredient in the tort, the infant is no longer by the weight
of authority, held responsible, where, by reason of his youth,
he could not have been c-.pable of bearing such malice.
Mr. Cooley in his work on Torts, section 120, says:"In those cases in which malice is a necessary ingredient in
the wrong,

an infant may or may not be liable according as

hid age and capacity may justify iuiputing malice to him or
preclude the idea of his indulging it.

The case of the al-

leged defamation affords a suitable illustration, the absurdity of a suit against a child of three years old will be

-12-slifficiently manifest,

but not more so than the granting of

immunity to the malicious utterances of a youth of twenty.
And while it

would be imyoscible to name any age which should

constitute the dividing line betwren res: nsibility and irresponsibility, in these and all siTmilar cases, there would
be no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that for all malicious injuries the wrong doer should be held responsible
if

he has arrived at an age and a maturity of nind which

should render him morally responsible for the consequences of
intentional action.

All general statements that an infant

is responsible like any other person for his torts, are to be
received with the qualification that the tort must hot be one
involving an element which in his -articular case must be
wanting.

If a child less than seven years cannot be held

responsible for larceny because of defect of understaiding
and incapacity to harbor a felriious intent, it would seem
preposterous to hold him respansible for his slander, the
moral quality of which he would be much less likely to appreciate, and injury from which must be -urely imaginary.",
I have been able to find no cases upon this roint but believe
Mr. Cooley to be correct.
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Neg ligencc.-

As in the cases -.
h':^e malice is in-

volved so wherc injuries a-,e caused 4>. ne-lLgence it is the
tendency of the court at the ::resent dey , to '-old infants of
tender age exempt from liability.
gences has been -iven thus:-

A definition of negli-

"Negligence is an inadvertant act

',a1
or omission in a responsible "_

being, whilo un-aged in a

lawful employment, that produces as a natural result damages
to another which might have been avoided by the use of ordinary care."

From this definition we can see that the

test to be used .in cases of uelgcnce, is: was there a
"want of ordina-y care?"

The infant of tender years does

-ot hno

is, and to hold him responsible

T;hat

ordinary care

for n t using it,

is

against reas:cn.

Underhill in
conflict in

his

the cases in

oro. Torts says:-

the 'Jnited5

There is a

State7 upon the question

as to whether the same degree of care is to be exacted from a
child of tender years, as from an adult" and he says that,
"the best oiinicn is that he is n ot," and cites 53 Ala., 70;
65 Ala., 506;
52 Cfl., 032;
78 Ill., 88;
5 A.e
14;
148 note;

1:0:

45 ',Zo.,

70;

64

at the last case cited,

03;
60.Y.,

N.11. , 320.--Let us
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60 N.Y., 326.

In

this case a child eight or nine years old

attempted to cross a street railroad and was struck and injured.

Action was brought on behalf of the chill for the in-

jury sustained, and for defense, the company put in that the
child was guilty of contributory negligence and so was not
entitled to recover.

The court said:-

"The degree of care

required of an infant of tender years, the omission of which
will constitute negligence on his part, is entirely different
froii- that required of an adult.

It is to be measured in

each case by the maturity and cepacity of the individual,
the la,: only requiring the degree of care -e be reasonably
expected in view thereof.,'

The child recovered damages.

The doctrine of Respondeat Superior cannot apply to
Infants, because of their incapacity to contract.
v.

Mount, 4 Robt., 553;

Robins

33 Hun Pr., 34.

Exeel tion to the Rule that the Infant is liable for
his Torts no matter what be the Age.

Torts which result

-is-

from Contracts.
Blac'-stone says that:-

"In some cases, a tort is

connected with a contract, and an infant is then held irresponsible, whenever to hold him liable on the ground of tort
would be virtually to render him responsible upon his contract obl-iation."

The courts will not allow a person to

enforce his contract obligation by bringing an action of
tort against the infant.

So it

hired a horse and injured it

-.%as held, that when a boy

while overdriving that there was

only a breach of contract and that the child was not answerable for tort.

Again where in exchanging horses the infant

fraudulently warranted his mare to be eound, he was protected
from the consequences on the same y.rinci~le.
2Marsh, 485;

4 Cams., 118;

19 Vt.,

505.

S T.&

R., 333;

The English

Courts favored this rule exceedingly and at one time showed
a tendency to carry it too far.

Thus in 1.Manby v. Scott,

where goods had been delivered to an infant, and a suit was
brought for trover and conversion, the court said:-

"The in-

fant shall not be chargeable for by that means all infants in
England would be ruined."

The later L'n-lish cases show a

disposition to hold the infant liable for his wilfull torts,

-13-

even though they be committed during a contract relation.
The case of 1laggis v.

Burnard,

14 C.D.(N.S. ), 45, will ji-

lustrate this matter,--A young man twenty years of age hired
a horse of a liveryman to ride, and he was expressly told
that the horse was not to be used for jumping purposes.
getting the horse the infant did use it
thereby killed the animal.
a breach of contract,

Upon

to jump with and

In this case there was not simply

but there vwas a decided and wilful wrong

Jumping the horse was acting entirely contrary

committed.

to the purpose for which the horse was bailed.

The test in

such a case as this is; "Has there been a departu e from the
cantract?

Has there been a wilful wrong committed?
It

has been held that conversion will lLe against

the infant, although the goods converted were in the possession
of the infant at the time they were converted, 6 Cranich., 226i2 Wend., 137;

15 Mich., 233;

32 Vt., 217.

Detinue has been held to lie against an infant,
where goods were delivered for a specific purpose not accomplished.

4 B.& P.,

140.

As to the question of fraud practiced in

the crea-

tion of the contract, the authritie? are not agreed.

In
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New York State, and some other states, an infant is held liable in tort for obtaining gocd
pay for them.

5 Hill, 391;

on crecit, intending not to
59 Ill., 341;

3 Pick.,

492.

In Vermont, it has been hceld that the -'l-a of infancy will prevail when the graveren
fraud consists in
contract.

38 V.,

of the action of the
in

a transaction which really originate
311.

The bettor view of the question of fraud connected
with contract is found in the case of Fitts v. Hall, 9 N.H.,
441.--

In this case an infant obtained ggods upon

falsely representing himself to be of age.
the opinion said:-

is

Judge Parker in

"The principle seems to be that if the tort

or fraud of an infant arises from a breach of contr'act, although there may have been false representations or concealments respecting the subject matter of it, the infant cannot
be charged for this breach of his -ro-iise or contract by a
change

in the form of the action.

But if -"the tort is

subsequesnt to the contract and not a mere brcach of it, but
a distinct, wilful and positive wrong itself, then, although
it may be connected with the contract,

the infant is liable."

The representation in Johnson v. Tye, and in the rresent
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case, that the defendant xzas of full

wc,
:as not part of the

contract, nor did it grow out of the contract or in any way
result from it.

It is not any part of its terms, nor was

it the consideration upon which the contract woits founded.
No contract was made about the

7efendant's age.

The sale

of the goods was not a conigomeration for the affirmation
or representation.

The representation was not a foundation

for an action of Assumpsit.
licto.

The matter arises purely ex de-

The fraud wDns intended to induce, and did induce the

plaintiff to make a contract for the sale of lots, but that
by no means makes it a part and parcel of the contract.

It

was antecedent to the contract, and if an infa nt is liable
for a jositive wrong connected with the contract, but arising
after the contract has been made, he may well be answerable
for one committed before the contract was entered into, although it may have led to the contract.,"

This is the doc-

trine established in the state of New YorL 5 Hill,

391,-

and also in Indiana Rice v. Boyer, 118 Ind., 472.
The Editor's of the American Leading Cases, claim
this doctrine to be unsound.

Saying that "the representation

by itself, was not actionable, for it was not an injury and
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the evidence of the conti-act v:hich made it

so,

of a legal right on the rart of the infant.

"

test in

nor the exercis
-------

The

an action 7gainst an infant is, whether a liability

can be made out without tam ing notice of the contract."
I believe xit> Itr. Parson that the editors of the Leading American Cases :.istooh the real ground of the decision
in

this case which was that a fraudulent repreventation,

whereby n:oney or goods are obtained by an infant,
actionable injury.

is

an

I Parson on Contracts, 7 Ed. 317 note.

See Walher v. Davis, 1 N.Y., 806;

23 Vt., 350;

5 Hill, 391.

However, the majority of the decisions are contra to
the above.

